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Introduction
The issue of safety continues to be of paramount importance in the
offshore oil industry. While there can be no opposition to legislation
which provides safety protections for workers in the offshore industry
comparable to those onshore, the incorporation of a comprehensive
offshore health and safety regime in the Newfoundland and Labrador and
Nova Scotia offshore areas is only now being realized.

I. The Regulatory History
Exploration in the Newfoundland and Labrador offshore began in the
1960s when Premier Joseph R. Smallwood announced that the province
claimed offshore resources. Since Newfoundland was, in 1949, the last
province to enter Confederation and since there was no clear allocation
of authority between the federal and provincial governments under the
Constitution, there was some measure of credibility to his claim.
During their terms as energy ministers for the Province of
Newfoundland, both Brian Peckford and Leo Barry asserted control
over the offshore, notwithstanding the competing federal claim. Their
ministries set up various regulatory mechanisms, including the nowdefunct Newfoundland Petroleum Corporation. Near the same time, the
Government of Canada responded to OPEC's rising influence by investing
massively in oil and gas development. In addition, it created Petro-Canada and launched the National Energy Program. To say that the Trudeau
government was disinterested in letting any province play a significant
role was to understate the matter.
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There were periodic discussions on the jurisdictional issues in the
late 1970s, but nothing much happened. Prime Minister Trudeau was not
inclined to negotiate seriously, and the Clark regime ended before it got
to the topic. With Trudeau's return, the 1980 constitutional amendment
process was launched, and the Province of Newfoundland sought, as part
of that process, a joint offshore regime. Although initially some progress
was made, the discussions led by Jean Chr6tien and William Marshall
ultimately collapsed with the parties reverting to their earlier positions.
In 1982, the drill rig Ocean Ranger sank in a vicious winter storm,
taking the lives of all onboard. Both governments set up inquiries, but the
subsequent outcry over their failure to cooperate forced them to jointly
constitute the Royal Commission on the Ocean Ranger Marine Disaster
headed by the Chief Justice of the Newfoundland Trial Division, T. Alex
Hickman.' The Commission focused on all aspects of the offshore, including the need for a better regulatory process. If anything, it overemphasized
the relevant marine dangers and unduly minimized the industrial dangers.
These shortcomings set the tone for the subsequent regulatory process.
With a change of government in Ottawa, negotiations restarted, and on
February 11, 1985, the Atlantic Accord2 was signed in St. John's by Prime
Minister Mulroney and Newfoundland Premier Brian Peckford. Notwithstanding the decision of the Supreme Court in the HiberniaReference,3
the Atlantic Accord gave a significant role to the province and asserted
that the province was entitled to be the primary beneficiary of offshore
resources. A very similar agreement was subsequently reached with Nova
Scotia, and parallel federal and provincial legislation was enacted first
regarding Newfoundland and Labrador offshore, and then the Nova Scotia
offshore.4

The Atlantic Accord has now been suspended by the implementing
legislation, but it has a significant interpretive value, and it indicates each
government's priorities at the time of its conclusion. Overall, its main tone

I. Canada, Royal Commission on the Ocean Ranger MarineDisaster (Ottawa: Minister of Supply
and Services Canada, 1984).
2.
The Atlantic Accord: Memorandum of Agreement Between the Government Of Canada And
The Government Of Newfoundland And Labrador On Offshore Oil And Gas Resource Management
and Revenue Sharing (11 February 1985) ["Atlantic Accord" ]
3.
Reference re the Seabed and Subsoil of the Continental Shelf Offshore Newfoundland, [ 1984] 1
S.C.R. 86, 5 D.L.R. (4th) 384 [HiberniaReference cited to S.C.R.].
4.
Canada-NewfoundlandAtlantic Accord Implementation Act, S.C. 1987, c. 3 [NewfoundlandAccord Act (Canada)];Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act,
S.C. 1985, c. 28 [Nova Scotia Accord Act (Canada)] [hereinafter collectively referred to as the Accord
Acts].
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reflects an underlying mutual suspicion. From the Atlantic Accord, for
instance, we see that Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board
(CNOPB) members were not allowed to be public servants. An arbitration
process exists to select a chairman in case of disagreement; the Board's
responsibility was to serve both governments and loyalty to either was
plainly considered to be suspect.
The Atlantic Accord's allocation of powers between the governments
was ambiguous. The federal government was responsible for "Canadianization," shipping, fisheries and the like. The province alone was
responsible for the royalty regime and "decisions related to provincial laws
of general application having effect in the offshore," pursuant to clause
61.5 Some decisions bounce back and forth depending upon national selfsufficiency, with an elaborate (and I believe never used) calculation of
who had what powers when.
The province had always focused on benefits, and several sections
address this primary concern. The legislation that was to be introduced
was to supercede the existing federal legislation, recognizing that where
provisions of the Canada Oil and Gas Act6 and the Oil and Gas Production and ConservationAct7 were consistent with the Atlantic Accord, they
would be retained.
Clause 61 of the Atlantic Accord8 sets out the undertaking by the federal government to pass legislation applying provincial laws "including
social legislation such as occupational health and safety legislation and
other legislation designed to protect workers" to the offshore. In the
federal Accord legislation for Newfoundland, 9 section 152 transforms
the political deal into law. Newfoundland's Occupational Health and
Safety Act"° and regulations, inter alia, are made applicable on any marine
installment or structure in the offshore, subject to the proviso that the
occupational health and safety legislation does not apply to matters for
which regulation might be made under sections 149(1)(d), (m), (o) or (p)
of the Newfoundland Accord Act (Canada).
These are enormously broad sections:
(d) concerning the safety and inspection of all operations conducted
in connection with the exploration and drilling for and the produc-

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Atlantic Accord, supra note 2, s. 61.
R.S.C. 1985, c. 0-6 (repealed).
R.S.C. 1985, c. 0-7.
Supra note 2.
Supra note 4, Newfoundland Accord Act (Canada).
R.S.N.L. 1990, c. 0-3.
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tion, conservation, processing and transportation of petroleum, and
prescribing the means to be taken to ensure the safety of such
operations.
(M) prescribing the conditions under which drilling operations may be
carried out.
(o)

prescribing minimum acceptable standards for methods, tools,
equipment and materials.

(p)

prescribing minimum acceptable standards for the construction,
alteration or use of any works, fittings, machinery or plant [etc.].

This arrangement allowed for Newfoundland's offshore occupational
health and safety legislation to be restructured in a manner appropriate for
its use in the offshore.
A first draft of occupational health and safety regulations under the
Newfoundland Accord Implementation Act (Canada) was prepared. However, unlike most of the drilling and production regulations, which had
a history with the federal government, occupational health and safety
rules did not and the regulations were not promulgated. This greatly
constrained the CNOPB and Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum
Board (CNSOPB) and caused one of the most bizarre failures of safety
regulation of which I am aware. How does a government rationalize its
failure to promulgate occupational health and safety rules in the area
where the Ocean Ranger sank? The failure to regulate was mitigated
by the Board's imposing compliance with the draft rules as a licensing
condition. However, although imposed compliance was marginally effective, it had the peculiar consequence of curtailing all efforts at reform
and progress for a regrettably long period. Fortunately, this period free of
regulation is coming to an end. As we move toward a new system, it is
informative to look at how some specific elements will be treated.

II. The Right to Refuse Work
Although section 152 of the Newfoundland Accord Act (Canada)1'
purported to nullify a majority of provincial occupational health and safety
provisions within the offshore, one area which was not caught was the

11.

Supra note 4, s. 152, Newfoundland Accord Act (Canada).
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right to refuse work. I will start with an overview of the right to refuse
work as it existed prior to the proposed amendments, and couple this with
an analysis of how the system will function if and when the proposed
amendments become law.
Both the Nova Scotia and Newfoundland provincial Occupational
Health and Safety Acts 2 provide an employee with a "right to refuse
work" where the employee believes on reasonable grounds that the
assigned work activity is likely to endanger the health or safety of the
employee or the health and safety of another person at the workplace. 3
In both jurisdictions, the right to refuse continues until remedial action
has been taken which satisfies the employee. This refusal may last until
the statutorily-mandated "committee" or workplace health and safety
representative has investigated the matter and advised the employee
to return to work, or until a provincial health and safety officer has
investigated the matter and advised the employee to return to work.
Both Accord Acts require that offshore operators develop and submit
a "Safety Plan" for approval by the respective offshore board. This Safety
Plan must be approved before authorization for a work or activity will be
issued. Both boards have prepared guidelines for the preparation of these
Safety Plans by operators, and in doing so have indicated that the right
to refuse work, as provided for in the provincial occupational health and
safety legislation, must be recognized and accounted for by a prospective
operator in the development of a Safety Plan. As a result, operators have
recognized this right in developing their Safety Plans. For example, Husky
Oil's Preliminary Safety Plan prepared for its White Rose Development
Application stated:
Husky Oil and contractor personnel will be informed of their right to
refuse to do any work that they feel, based on reasonable grounds, is dangerous to their health and safety or to the health and safety of other per-

sons at the worksite. Personnel shall also be informed of the procedures to
be followed if such a situation were to occur. 14

12. The Nova Scotia Act is Occupational Health and Safety Act, S.N.S. 1996, c. 7. The Newfoundland and Labrador Act is Occupational Health and Safety Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. 0-3 [hereinafter
referred to collectively as the OHS Acts].
13. Ibid.
14. "White Rose Oilfield Development Application: Volume 5 Preliminary Safety Plan and Concept Safety Analysis," online: Husky Energy <http://www.huskyenergy.ca/whiterose/development/
downloads/Vol5_Part I .pdf>.
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Where this right to refuse work is invoked by an employee, the occupational health and safety legislation places obligations on both the employer
and the employee. While there is some variation in wording and structure
between the two provincial acts, they are fundamentally the same regarding the primary obligations they create. In both jurisdictions, when an
employee exercises the right to refuse work, the employee must immediately report the situation to a supervisor. If the situation is not remedied
to the employee's satisfaction, the employee must report it to the provincial Occupational Health and Safety Division. 5 The employee must also
accept a reassignment to other duties while the unsafe situation is being
rectified by the employer.
There are some variations between the legislation in the two
provinces. For example, in both OHS Acts, the right to refuse work is qualified as existing only where "reasonable grounds" exist for the belief that
the assigned task is likely to endanger health or safety. However, the Newfoundland OHS Act 6 further mandates in section 48 that the employee is
under a positive duty not to take advantage of this right without reasonable
grounds for doing so. Thus, it might be argued that the Newfoundland
OHS Act holds employees to a higher standard of accountability in exercising the right to refuse work.
For its part, the Nova Scotia Occupational Health and Safety Act17
contains provisions which are absent in the Newfoundland and Labrador
legislation. For example, section 43(9) provides that an employee may
not refuse work where the refusal puts the life, health or safety of another
person in danger or where the danger which led to the work refusal is
inherent in the work of the employee. One possible example of the type
of work which might attract one or both aspects of this provision is that
of firefighting, as it is inherently dangerous work upon which the safety
of others is dependant. Thus, section 43(9) of the Nova Scotia OHS Act 8
creates an obligation on employees which is not explicitly contemplated
by the Newfoundland OHS Act.
When the obligations of employers under the two provincial occupational health and safety Acts are examined, one again finds that they
are fundamentally similar. For example, under both Acts, when the em-

15. In Nova Scotia, the OccupationalHealth and Safety Act provides for an intermediate reporting
step to a joint (employer/employee) occupational health and safety committee prior to escalation to
the Division; see s. 43(2)(b).
16. Supra note 12, Newfoundland, s. 48.
17. Supra note 12, Nova Scotia, s. 43(a).
18. Supra note 12, Nova Scotia, s. 43(a).
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ployee exercises the right to refuse, the employer may reassign the worker
until the conditions which led to the refusal are rectified. 19 Furthermore,
under both Acts, the employer must continue to pay the employee the
same wages and benefits that the employee would have received had the
employee continued in his or her normal work regardless of whether the
employee is reassigned to alternate work.20 However, as with the obligations upon employees, there are minor differences between the two acts.
The Nova Scotia legislation makes the ability of the employer to reassign
the employee subject to any applicable collective agreements,' while
under the Newfoundland OHS Act, this prerogative is unqualified.22 Both
acts preclude employers from taking punitive or discriminatory action
3
against an employee who properly exercises the right to refuse work. If
there is punitive or discriminatory action in Nova Scotia, the employee
must file a complaint to a Division Officer within thirty days, provided
that an arbitrator has not already been appointed to deal with the complaint
pursuant to a collective agreement. If an arbitrator has been appointed, the
employee must have the complaint dealt with under the process set out by
the collective agreement. Otherwise, the complaint will be investigated
by a Division Officer who will issue a finding and an order specifying
the remedial action to be taken by the employer, or determine that there
are no grounds upon which to issue an order.24 Under the Newfoundland
OHS Act, there is no deadline specified by which complaints must be filed,
and the employee has the choice to proceed under any existing collective
agreement or to have the provincial Labour Relations Board deal with a
complaint of discrimination.25
As a result of the extension of provincial social legislation under the
Accord Acts to the Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador offshore areas, the right to refuse work exists, with minor variations, in both
jurisdictions. In the context of the East Coast offshore industry, many
employers, as well as employees, operate or work in both jurisdictions.
This creates a situation with the potential for confusion because there
must be compliance with two sets of slightly different occupational health
and safety regulations. However, the implementation of the proposed

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Supra
Supra
Supra
Supra
Supra
Supra
Supra

note
note
note
note
note
note
note

12,
12,
12,
12,
12,
12,
12,

Newfoundland at s. 45(2); Nova Scotia at s. 43(5).
Newfoundland at s. 45(3); supra note 12, Nova Scotia at s. 43(6).
Nova Scotia at s. 43(5).
Newfoundland at s. 45(2).
Newfoundland at s. 49(d); Nova Scotia at s. 45(2).
Nova Scotia at ss. 46(l)(c), 46(1)(d), 46(2).
Newfoundland at s. 51.
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amendments to the Accord Acts will create a uniform system of occupational health and safety regulations for both jurisdictions. Employers and
employees alike will operate under a single occupational health and safety
regime for both offshore areas. The proposed amendments as they relate
to the right to refuse work are discussed below.

III. Relevant ProposedAmendments
The proposed amendments to the Accord Acts will effectively remove the
operation of the provincial occupational health and safety acts and replace
them with new provisions contained within the provincial Accord Acts
themselves. The definition of provincial "social legislation" 26 will change
so that provincial occupational health and safety legislation will no longer
be included. This is full circle.
An extensive and comprehensive set of provisions will be added to
the Accord Acts by the addition of new sections following section 205
of the Newfoundland Accord Act (Canada),2 and following section 210
of the Nova Scotia Accord Act (Canada).28 This will lead to a single occupational health and safety regime for both offshore jurisdictions. The
federal government likes to cite uniformity as a benefit, but frankly that is
a red herring. Each offshore operation is truly unique and presents its own
challenges. Uniformity is primarily of benefit to regulators.
A number of provisions, new to one or the other of the provinces, will
affect the way in which the right to refuse work will operate in the offshore
jurisdictions. The right to refuse work is currently qualified under the Nova
Scotia OccupationalHealth andSafety Act to preclude the right from being
exercised where such refusal would put other employees at risk or where
the danger complained of is an inherent aspect of the employee's job. The
proposed amendments incorporate this exception and thus the exception
would operate in the Newfoundland and Labrador offshore area.
The protocol to be followed subsequent to the right being invoked
by an employee would also be made uniform following adoption of the
amendments. While both provincial occupational health and safety acts
stipulate the employee is to report the reason for the work stoppage to a

26.

Discussion Paper Amending the Accord Acts to Incorporate OccupationalSafety and Health,

online: East Coast Offshore Occupational Health and Safety <http://www.offshoreohs.ca/media/
documents/webdraftbillns.pdf> [Proposed Amendments].
27.
28.

Supra note 4, Newfoundland Accord Act (Canada).
Supra note 4, Nova Scotia Accord Act (Canada).
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supervisor, the Nova Scotia OccupationalHealth and Safety Act specifies
the ensuing sequence of reporting requirements, which includes informing
the workplace health and safety committee, and finally, if necessary, notifying the provincial division.2 9 The Newfoundland and LabradorOccupational Health and Safety Act has adopted a less specific process. Under the
proposed amendments to the Accord Acts, the new process would generally reflect the Nova Scotia OccupationalHealth and Safety Act provisions.
The process of escalation would, however, conclude with an inspection
by a safety officer appointed by the Offshore Petroleum Board, rather
than one by the provincial Occupational Health and Safety Division as
mandated by the provincial occupational health and safety legislation.
The variation between the two provinces in the treatment of the issue
of reassignment is also addressed. The reassignment of an employee who
refuses to work will be made subject to any relevant collective agreements, as is the case currently under the Nova Scotia OccupationalHealth
and Safety Act.
The amendments also address issues which are not currently dealt with
by either provincial occupational health and safety act. For example, the
amendments provide that other employees affected by a work stoppage
will continue to be paid their regular wages and benefits. The amendments
also provide that an employer may reassign those employees, as well as
the refusing employee. These amendments are made subject to any applicable collective agreements.
One new provision creates the potential for employees to be required
to repay an employer for wages or benefits paid during a work stoppage
if it is determined that the employee refused work knowing that no genuine circumstances existed to warrant the refusal. Furthermore, if other
employees participate in the work stoppage having knowledge that the refusal is without merit, they can also be compelled to repay wages received
during the stoppage. Clearly, however, the usefulness of these new provisions is in their deterrence value, not in their loss compensation ability.
Penalties for unwarranted work stoppages will create a disincentive
against the frivolous exercise of the right by employees to refuse work.
Where the Newfoundland and LabradorOccupationalHealth and Safety
Act explicitly places a duty on employees to not "take advantage" of the
right of refusal, the proposed amendment actually creates a remedial
mechanism to deal with unjustified work stoppages. One might question
the entire premise behind such an elaborate code as there is no evidence in
the offshore of significant numbers of frivolous refusal of work claims.
29.

Supra note 12, Nova Scotia at s. 43(2).
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IV. Directors'andOfficers' Liability
One of the goals under the proposed amendments is "support for an occupational health and safety culture that recognizes a shared responsibility in
the workplace." 30 In order to achieve this goal, responsibility for safety has
been allocated to all members of the production chain. As outlined:
Duties will be defined for each player in the offshore workplace - from
Operator to Employer; Supplier; Employee; Supervisor; Owner; providers of Service; Interest Owner; and Corporate Officials so that they are
required to take all reasonable measures to ensure the health and safety
of persons at the workplace. A specific set of duties is outlined for each
3
player. '
The drafters of these rules should recognize that despite the magnitude of
its many operations the industry operates worldwide at a very high level of
safety. Contractors have tens of thousands of employees, and some operate
in 100 or more countries. Schlumberger boasts its employees represent 140
nationalities. The Norwegian company, ABB Oil Gas and Petrochemicals,
has 700 subsidiary companies. Many entities operating offshore are joint
venturers or exist in other corporate forms. It is absolutely critical that
any statutory statement of duties reflects the reality of offshore operations
instead of an utopian ideal.
The proposed amendments to the Accord Acts include provisions
outlining directors' and officers' liability. Noncompliance with the statute
may result in the prosecution of these officials for safety shortcomings on
the part of their respective corporations. The proposed amendment to the
Nova Scotia Accord Act (Canada)in section 210.79 specifically states the
elements of director and officer liability:
(1) If a corporation commits an offence under the provisions of this Act or
regulations concerning health or safety, any of the following persons
who directed, authorized, assented to, acquiesced in or participated
in the commission of the offence is a party to and guilty of the offence
and is liable on conviction to the punishment provided for the offence,
whether or not the corporation has been prosecuted or convicted:
(a) any officer, director, agent or mandatory of the corporation; and

30.

Supra note 26.

31.

Supra note 26.
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(b) any other person exercising managerial or supervisory functions in
32

the corporation.

In a corporate commercial context, terms such as "authorized" and
"acquiesced" have been interpreted by the courts to imply an informed
or an intentional act.33 As such, directors and officers have frequently

avoided liability simply by distancing themselves from corporate
decisions. However, while many corporate cases have concluded that
officers' and directors' liability will only accrue by virtue of a positive act
on the part of the official, this proposition has been the subject of a longstanding legal controversy. In this context of uncertainty, the reliance by
directors and officers on such strategies could potentially expose them to
significant liabilities.
One specific area of uncertainty concerns the nature of conduct that
' The issue has been considered in the
will be considered "acquiescence." 34
environmental law context, which has produced conflicting provincial
court decisions.3 In R. v. Bata Industries Ltd.,36 the court found that the
prosecution did not bear the burden of demonstrating that the defendants
failed to take all reasonable care. Instead, the defendants were required to
establish a defence of due diligence on a balance of probability standard.
Recently, the case of R. v. A & A Foods Ltd.37 re-opened the debate
surrounding the proper interpretation of acquiescence. While this is a
stand-alone case (it has been neither rejected nor followed in subsequent
decisions), it should serve as a warning to officers and directors that in
situations involving issues of public health and safety, courts may be willing to impose a strict liability standard. In A & A Foods, Justice Hood was
extremely critical of the restrictive interpretation given to terms such as
"authorized," "permitted" and "acquiesced." 38 He reiterated the position
espoused in Bata, that directors and officers will be held to a strict liability
standard and bear the onus of demonstrating due diligence.3 9 In justifying
his interpretation of the terms "authorized," "permitted" and "acquiesced,"
Judge Hood stated:
32.
33.

Supra note 26 at s. 210.79 [emphasis added].
R. v. Armaugh Corp. (1993), 1 C.C.L.S. 87 [SecuritiesAct, R.S.O. 1980, c. 4661; referred to in

R. v. Boyle (2001), 300 A.R. 284 [SecuritiesAct, S.A. 1981, c. S-6.1].

34. J. Benidickson, Essentials of CanadianLaw: Environmental Law 2nd ed., (Toronto: Irwin Law,
2002) at 168.
35. See R. v. Bata Industries Ltd (1992), 9 O.R. (3d) 329; and R. v. Commander Business Furniture
Inc. (1992), 9 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 185.
36. Ibid.
37. (1997), 120 CCC. (3d)513.
38. Ibid. at para. 31.
39. Ibid. at para. 18.
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In Armough the learned judge seemingly restricted the meaning to be
given to the terms: "authorized", "permitted" or "acquiesced", to positive
action on the part of the accused officers or directors. This may have been
due, at least in part, to the nature of the offence committed by the corporation. However, and with respect, I am not satisfied that he was correct
in doing so, or that the terms necessarily imply a knowing or intentional
act or degree of mens rea. Such an interpretation of those terms is, in my
view, inconsistent with the offence being one of strict liability, an offence
of negligence. It is also contrary to the decision in Sault.'
As demonstrated by the conflicting case law on this point, the nature of
the conduct attracting directors' and officers' liability is yet to be finally
resolved. Likely as a result of these interpretive difficulties, the proposed
amendment to section 210.22.1 of the Nova Scotia Accord Act (Canada)
provides:
Every director and officer of a corporation shall take all reasonable measures to ensure that the corporation complies with this Act and the regulations and, where applicable, the commitments in a declaration and the
conditions of the authorization."'
In conclusion, sections 210.79 and 210.22.1 appear to dictate that failure on the part of corporate directors and officers to establish procedural
safeguards to ensure compliance with the Act may very well be viewed as
"acquiescence" by a court of law.
1. Strict Liability Offences - General
The law surrounding strict liability offences is generally settled in Canada.
In strict liability offences the commission of the physical elements of the
offence, in and of themselves, may lead to conviction regardless of the
accused's intent. In other words, strict liability offences require no mens
rea.
The Supreme Court of Canada decision in R. v. Sault Ste. Marie42
first recognized strict liability offences under Canadian law. These
offences generally apply to quotidian matters that are "in substance of a
civil nature. ' 43 Canadian jurisprudence has dictated that the regulation of

40.
41.
42.
43.

Ibid. at para. 31.
Proposed Amendments, supra note 26 at s. 210.22.1.
(1978), C.C.C. (2d) 353 (S.C.C.).
Ibid. at 357.
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occupational health and safety falls within the above definition.' The key
characteristic of a strict liability offence is that it places a reverse onus on
the accused.
In R. v. Wholesale Travel, the Supreme Court of Canada addressed
the issue of Charter rights in the context of strict liability offences and
concluded that reverse onus provisions are generally constitutional.45 To
quote Justices L'Heureux-Dub and Cory:
Quite simply, the enforcement of regulatory offences would be rendered
virtually impossible if the Crown were required to prove negligence beyond a reasonable doubt. The means of proof of reasonable care will be
peculiarly within the knowledge and ability of the regulated accused.'
Further, the justices stated:
The imposition of a reverse persuasive onus on the accused to establish
due diligence on a balance of probabilities does not run counter to the
presumption of innocence, notwithstanding the fact that the same reversal
of onus would violate s. 11 (d) in a criminal context....
2. Directors' and Officers' Offences - Penalties
In the proposed health and safety legislation, directors and officers have
the potential of being charged with indictable offences. Proposed section
210.77(2) provides:
(2) Every person who is guilty under subsection (1) is liable
(a) on conviction on indictment, to a fine not exceeding one million
dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or to
both.
(b) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding one hundred thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or
to both.48
Notwithstanding that the proposed amendments to the Accord Acts were
intended to make occupational health and safety laws offshore comparable
to those onshore, the proposed amendments carry more severe penalties in
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

R. v. Timminco Ltd. (2001), 153 C.C.C. (3d) 521 (Ont. C.A.).
[1991] 3 S.C.R. 154 [Wholesale Travel].
Ibid. at 102.
Ibid. at 110.
Supra note 26 at s. 210.77(2).
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the offshore context. Compare, for example the Nova Scotia Occupational
Health and Safety Act which prescribes in section 74 that:
A person who
(a) contravenes this Act or the regulations; or
(b) fails to comply with
(i)
an order or direction made pursuant to this Act or the
regulations, or
(ii)
a provision of a code of practice adopted pursuant to Section
66,
is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine
not exceeding two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, or to a term
of imprisonment not exceeding two years, or to both a fine and
imprisonment.

49

Similarly the Newfoundland OccupationalHealth and Safety Act provides
in section 67(2):
Where a person, other than a corporation, is convicted of an offence
under subsection (1), he or she is liable to a fine of not less than $500 and
not more than $250,000 or to a term of imprisonment not exceeding 12
50
months or to both a fine and imprisonment.
While the potential for imprisonment exists under both occupational
health and safety acts, a prison term of up to five years and monetary
penalties of up to one million dollars go well beyond the penalty provisions presently enacted onshore.
In Wholesale Travel, the Supreme Court of Canada dealt with the
penalty provisions in the CompetitionAct. 1 The Act prescribed that strict
liability offences could be treated as offences carrying a penalty of up to
five years in prison. Following that decision, it seems likely that similar
provisions in the Accord Acts would stand up to similar scrutiny. While the
Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Wholesale Travel has been criticized by legal scholars, 52 it is still considered good law in Canada.

49.
50.
51.
52.
Ltd.,

S.N.S. 1996, c.7.
R.S.N. 1990, c. 0-3, ibid.
R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23.
Supra note 45. Don Stuart, CanadianCriminal Law: A Treatise (Toronto: Thompson Canada
1995) at 180.
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3. Strict Liability Offences - Due Diligence
Those charged with strict liability offences may avoid liability by proving
that reasonable care was taken to avoid the situation which precipitated
the charges. If an accused reasonably believed in a mistaken set of facts,
which, if true, would render the act or omission innocent, or took all
reasonable steps to avoid the particular event, he or she will not be found
culpable.
In Bata, a leading case in director/officer liability, Judge Ormston
described the burden of a due diligence defence:
[Directors] must establish that they exercised all reasonable care by establishing a proper system to prevent commission of the offence and by
taking reasonable steps to ensure the effective operation of the system.
The availability of the defence to a corporation will depend on whether
such due diligence was taken by those who are the directing mind and
will of the corporation, whose acts are therefore, in law, the acts of the
corporation itself. "
He went on to outline the factors relevant to the determination of whether
a defence of due diligence will be successful:
(a) Did the board of directors establish a health and safety "system" as
indicated in R. v. Sault Ste. Marie, i.e., was there supervision or inspection? was there improvement in business methods? did he exhort those he
controlled or influenced?
(b) Did each director ensure that the corporate officers have been instructed to set up a system sufficient within the terms and practices of
its industry of ensuring compliance with [occupational health and safety]
laws, to ensure that the officers report back periodically to the board on
the operation of the system, and to ensure that the officers are instructed to
report any substantial non-compliance to the board in a timely manner?
(c) The directors are responsible for reviewing the [occupational health
and safety] reports provided by the officers of the corporation but are
justified in placing reasonable reliance on reports provided to them by
corporate officers, consultants, counsel or other informed parties.

53.

Supra note 35 at 339.
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(d) The directors should substantiate that the officers are promptly addressing [occupational health and safety] concerns brought to their attention by government agencies or other concerned parties including shareholders.
(e) The directors should be aware of the standards of their industry and
other industries which deal with [occupational health and safety] risks.
(f) The directors should immediately and personally react when they
notice the system has failed.54
It is important to realize that a corporation may not simply rely on the recommendations of a Chief Safety Officer in order to meet a due diligence
defence threshold. In R. v. PlacerDevelopments, the court held:
Reliance on specific instructions from government officials does not
constitute a defence if a reasonably prudent person would question the
implied or explicit advice from government officials. In many instances,
corporations may possess more knowledge about the specific environment
and nature of operations than the government department. Any reason to
question government actions should be brought clearly to the attention of
the government agency before adhering to advice or directions that are
55
known to be deficient.
Major oil corporations are expected to possess sufficient expertise to
ascertain the health and safety risks within the offshore industry without
recourse to government assistance. As such, it is important that corporations take the initiative to ensure a safe workplace environment.
Directors and officers must remain vigilant in ensuring an adequate
system is in place, not merely to avoid liability, but more importantly to
foster a safe work environment. By having a proper safety policy in place,
directors and officers will avoid liability by preventing the occurrence of
accidents in the first place.

54.
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Ibid. at 362-63 [modifications for OHS added].
(1983), 13 C.E.L.R. 42 (Y. Terr. Ct.).

